But agreeable amusements also are desirable for not their own sake; we do
not pursue them as a means to something else, for as a matter of fact they
are more often harmful than beneficial, causing men to neglect their
health and their estates. Yet persons whom the world counts happy usually
have recourse to such pastimes; and this is why adepts in such pastimes
stand in high favor with princes, because they make themselves agreeable
in supplying what their patrons desire, and what they want is amusement.
So it is supposed that amusements are a component part of happiness,
because princes and potentates devote their leisure to them. But (i)
perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue and
intelligence, which are the sources of man's higher activities, do not
depend on the possession of power; and if these persons, having no taste
for [20] pure and liberal pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the
body, we must not on that account suppose that bodily pleasures are
the more desirable. Children imagine that the things they themselves
value are actually the best; it is not surprising therefore that, as
children and grown men have different standards of value, so also should
the worthless and the virtuous.
[Chapter 7]
And that happiness consists in contemplation may be accepted as agreeing
both with the results already reached and with the truth. For
contemplation is at once the highest form of [20] activity (since the
intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects with which the
intellect deals are the highest things that can be known), and also it is
the most continuous, for we can reflect more continuously than we can
carry on any form of action. And again we suppose that happiness must
contain an element of pleasure; now activity in accordance with wisdom is
admittedly the most pleasant of the activities in accordance with virtue:
at all events it is held that philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom contains
pleasures of marvellous purity and permanence, and it is reasonable to
suppose that the enjoyment of knowledge is a still pleasanter occupation
than the pursuit of it. Also the activity of contemplation will be found
to possess in the highest degree the quality that is termed
self-sufficiency; for while it is true that the wise man equally with the
just man and the rest requires the necessaries of life, yet, these being
adequately supplied, whereas the just man needs other persons towards whom
or with whose aid he may act justly, and so likewise do the temperate man
and the brave man and the others, the wise man on the contrary can also
contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is; no doubt he will
study better with the aid of fellow-workers, but still he is the most
self-sufficient of men.
[1177b] Also the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only
activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond the
actual act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look to
secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the action itself. Also
happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do business in order that
we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may have peace. Now
the practical virtues are exercised in politics or in warfare; but the
pursuits of politics and war seem to be unleisured--those of war indeed
entirely so, for no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war,
nor deliberately takes steps to cause a war: a man would be thought an
utterly bloodthirsty character if he declared war on a friendly state for
the sake of causing battles and massacres. But the activity of the
politician also is unleisured, and aims at securing something beyond the
mere participation in politics--positions of authority and honor, or, if
the happiness of the politician himself and of his fellow-citizens, this
happiness conceived as something distinct from political activity (indeed
we are clearly investigating it as so distinct). If then among practical
pursuits displaying the virtues, politics and war stand out preeminent in
nobility and grandeur, and yet they are unleisured, and directed to some
further end, not chosen for their own sakes: whereas the activity of the
intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in
contemplation, [20] and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to
contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore augmenting its
activity: and if accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to
be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such freedom from fatigue as is
possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness: it follows
that it is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human
happiness--provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing
that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.
Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in
virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something
within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to
his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise
of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in
comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison
with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should
have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought
so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live
in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small
in bulk, [1178a] in power and value it far surpasses all the rest. It may
even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the
dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a
man should choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than
himself. Moreover what was said before will apply here also: that which is
best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the
nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best and the
pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything
else is man; therefore this life will be the happiest.
[Chapter 8]
The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness is some
form of contemplative activity. The gods, as we conceive them, enjoy
supreme felicity and happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute
to them? Just actions? but will it not seem ridiculous to think of them as
making contracts, restoring deposits and the like? Then brave
actions--enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so doing?
Or liberal actions? but to whom will they give? Besides, it would be
absurd to suppose that they actually have a coinage or currency of some
sort! And temperate actions--what will these mean in their case? surely it
would be derogatory to praise them for not having evil desires! If we go
through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem
trifling and unworthy of the gods. Yet nevertheless they have always been
conceived as, at all events, living, and therefore living actively, for we
cannot suppose they are always asleep like [20] Endymion. But for a living
being, if we eliminate action, and a fortiori creative action, what
remains save contemplation? It follows that the activity of God, which is
transcendent in blessedness, is the activity of contemplation; and
therefore among human activities that which is most akin to the divine
activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness.
A further confirmation is that the lower animals cannot partake of
happiness, because they are completely devoid of the contemplative
activity. The whole of the life of the gods is blessed, and that of man is
so in so far as it contains some likeness to the divine activity; but none
of the other animals possess happiness, because they are entirely
incapable of contemplation. Happiness therefore is co-extensive in its
range with contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the faculty
of contemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental
concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in it, since contemplation is
valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of
contemplation.
But the philosopher being a man will also need external well--being, since
man's nature is not self--sufficient for the activity of contemplation,
but he must also have bodily health and a supply of food and other
requirements. [1179a] Yet if supreme blessedness is not possible without
external goods, it must not be supposed that happiness will demand many or
great possessions; for self-sufficiency does not depend on excessive
abundance, nor does moral conduct, and it is possible to perform noble
deeds even without being ruler of land and sea: one can do virtuous acts
with quite moderate resources. This may be clearly observed in experience:
private citizens do not seem to be less but more given to doing virtuous
actions than princes and potentates. It is sufficient then if moderate
resources are forthcoming; for a life of virtuous activity will be
essentially a happy life. Solon also doubtless gave a good description of
happiness, when he said that in his opinion those men were happy who,
being moderately equipped with external goods, had performed noble
exploits and had lived temperately; for it is possible for a man of but
moderate possessions to do what is right. Anaxagoras again does not seem
to have conceived the happy man as rich or powerful, since he says that he
would not be surprised if he were to appear a strange sort of person in
the eyes of the many; for most men judge by externals, which are all that
they can perceive. So our theories seem to be in agreement with the
opinions of the wise. Such arguments then carry some degree of conviction;
but it is by the practical experience of life and conduct that the truth
is really tested, since it is ther [20] that the final decision lies. We
must therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bringing them
to the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the facts,
we may accept them; if found to disagree, we must deem them mere
theories. And it seems likely that the man who pursues intellectual
activity, and who cultivates his intellect and keeps that in the best
condition, is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if, as is
generally believed, the gods exercise some superintendence over human
affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take pleasure in
that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely the
intellect, and that they recompense with their favors those men who esteem
and honor this most, because these care for the things dear to themselves,
and act rightly and nobly. Now it is clear that all these attributes
belong most of all to the wise man. He therefore is most beloved by the
gods; and if so, he is naturally most happy. Here is another proof that
the wise man is the happiest.
But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is
reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest
virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then
this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and
lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine,
either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the
divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance
with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and
it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of
contemplation.
The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, is happy only in a secondary
degree. For the moral activities are purely human: Justice, I mean,
Courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with our
fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and services and
in our various actions, and in our emotions also; and all of these things
seem to be purely human affairs. And some moral actions are thought to be
the outcome of the physical constitution, and moral virtue is thought to
have a close affinity in many respects with the passions. Moreover,
Prudence is intimately connected with Moral Virtue, and this with
Prudence, inasmuch as the first Principles which Prudence employs are
determined by the Moral Virtues, and the right standard for the Moral
Virtues is determined by Prudence. But these being also connected with
[20] the passions are related to our composite nature; now the virtues of
our composite nature are purely human; so therefore also is the life that
manifests these virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the
happiness that belongs to the intellect is separate: so much may be said
about it here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of
our present purpose. And such happiness would appear to need but little
external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue.
Both, it may be granted, require the mere necessaries of life, and that in
an equal degree (though the politician does as a matter of fact take more
trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the philosopher) ; for
in this respect there may be little difference between them. But for the
purpose of their special activities their requirements will differ
widely. The liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions,
and so indeed will the just man in order to discharge his obligations
(since mere intentions are invisible, and even the unjust pretend to wish
to act justly); and the brave man will need strength if he is to perform
any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man opportunity for
indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue,
show that he is virtuous? It is disputed also whether purpose or
performance is the more important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to
depend on both; [1178b] now the perfection of virtue will clearly consist
in both; but the performance of virtuous actions requires much outward
equipment, and the more so the greater and more noble the actions are. But
the student, so far as the pursuit of his activity is concerned, needs no
external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may almost be said to
be a hindrance to contemplation; though it is true that, being a man and
living in the society of others, he chooses to engage in virtuous action,
and so will need external goods to carry on his life as a human being.